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CASENOTE

CREDITOR'S RIGHTS: No

SATISFACTION TO BE FOUND IN
OHIO'S APPLICATION OF SECTION 1-207 TO THE DOCTRINE OF

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION-AFC Interiors v. DiCello, 46 Ohio
St. 3d 1, 544 N.E.2d 869 (1989).
I.

IN4TRODUCTION

In the recent case of AFC Interiors v. DiCello,1 the Ohio Supreme
Court addressed the applicability of Ohio Revised Code section
1301.132 to the common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction in the
"full payment" or "conditional check" situation.' This decision is significant because it affects the rights of the debtor and creditor when
there is a bona fide dispute regarding the debtor's obligation.
An example of the factual context in which this issue often arises
is a contract for the sale of goods under which the debtor, in good
faith, believes his obligation amounts to $4,000. The creditor honestly
claims, however, that the debtor owes him $5,000 under the terms of
the contract. In this context, a bona fide dispute exists between the
parties. In order to settle the dispute in an informal, efficient manner,
the debtor tenders a check for $4,500 to the creditor. On the back of
the check, the debtor indicates that the check is offered as "payment in
full" and thus is intended to settle the conflict between the parties.
Upon receipt of the check, the creditor is faced with a choice.
First, he can cash the check and consider the dispute settled. Second,
under the common law, the creditor's only alternative is to return the
check to the debtor and bring suit for the amount the creditor believes
1. 46 Ohio St. 3d 1,544 N.E.2d 869 (1989).
2. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1301.13 (Baldwin 1988). This section states, "[a] party who
with explicit reservation of rights performs or promises performance or assents to performance in
a manner demanded or offered by the other party does not thereby prejudice the rights reserved.
Such words as 'without prejudice,' 'under protest,' or the like are sufficient." Id. Section 1301.13
is Ohio's equivalent of section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) prior to its corrective amendment in 1990. U.C.C. § 1-207 (1989). See infra note 223 for the amended section.
3. AFC Interiors, 46 Ohio St. 3d at 3, 544 N.E.2d at 871. A "full payment" or "conditional" check is defined as a "check which conveys the message to the payee that by cashing the
check he is assenting to the conditions under which it is tendered." Rosenthal, Discord and Dissatisfaction: Section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 48, 49 n.6

(1978).
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to be due to him. The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in AFC Interiors,
however, now gives the creditor a third option under this fact situation.
The creditor can insert language reserving his rights on the back of the
check and then negotiate the check." By claiming that this reservation
of rights is in accordance with section 1-207, the creditor can still bring
suit for the additional $500 he believes the debtor owes him.
This article focuses on the applicability of section 1-207 to Ohio's
common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction. It also examines in
detail the differing views of the legitimacy of accord and satisfaction.
This article then critically examines the decision in AFC Interiors and
its policy impact. Finally, several possible responses to the decision in
AFC Interiors are set forth and evaluated.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Law of Accord and Satisfaction in Ohio

Prior to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in AFC Interiors v.
DiCello,5 Ohio's approach to the doctrine of accord and satisfaction
was the same as the approach of the majority of states: retention and
use of money or cashing a check for a disputed claim constitutes acceptance of the offer upon the condition it was tendered.' In Ohio, an
accord is defined as "an agreement for giving and taking a thing in
satisfaction of an existing claim or debt i and a satisfaction as "the
actual giving and taking of such thing." 7 The doctrine of accord and
satisfaction is based upon an agreement beltween the parties to settle an
existing dispute.8 The agreement is viewed as a new contract, either
express or implied, between the parties where the offeror is the master
of his offer. 9 The essential elements of a contract must, therefore, exist
in order for the accord and satisfaction to be valid. 10 These elements
have been incorporated into the requirements 'off an accord and
satisfaction.
4. AFC Interiors, 46 Ohio St. 3d at 5-6, 544 N.E.2d at 873.1
5. Id. at 1, 544 N.E.2d at 869.
6. Comment, Does U.C.C. 'Section 1-207 Apply to the Doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction
by Conditional Check?, 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 515, 515-18 (1977). The only state which does
not adhere to the majority approach is South Dakota. Siegele v. Des Moines Mut.' Hail Ins. Ass'n,
28 S.D. 142, 132 N.W. 697 (1911); see also infra text accompanying notes 170-71.'
7. Aerosonic Instrument Corp. v. NuTone, Inc., 80 Ohio L. Abs. 289, 290, 152 N.E.2d 739,
740 (C.P. 1958); accord Hearst Corp. v. Lauerer, Markin & Gibbs, 37 Ohio App. 3d 87, 89, 524
N.E.2d 193, 195 (1987).
8. Aerosonic, 80 Ohio L. Abs. 290, 152 N.E.2d at 739.
9. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERs, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 13-24 (3d ed. 1988).
10. Aerosonic, 80 Ohio L. Abs. 290, 152 N.E.2d at 739. These elements are: (I) a proper
subject matter; (2) competent parties; (3) an assent or meeting of the minds of the parties; and
(4) consideration. Id. at 740.
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Ohio's requirements for a valid accord and satisfaction were first
set forth in Seeds Grain & Hay Co. v. Conger," which involved a dispute stemming from defendant's inability to fulfill his contractual obligations to supply oats to plaintiff. 2 The parties disputed the amount

that defendant owed plaintiff for damages.' 3 Defendant sent plaintiff a
check marked "payment in full," which plaintiff negotiated." The Ohio
Supreme Court found that there had been a valid accord and satisfaction of the debt.' 5 In reaching this decision, the court first distinguished
between unliquidated' 6 and liquidated 7 claims.1 8 The court acknowledged that the dispute in this case was bona fide, that the check was an
express offer to settle the dispute, and that plaintiff's negotiation of the

check constituted an acceptance of defendant's offer.' 9
Several Ohio courts relied upon this early decision as enunciating
the elements necessary for a valid accord and satisfaction." These ele-

ments are a proper subject matter, competent parties, mutual assent
and consideration .2

The existence of these elements establishing a

valid accord and satisfaction is a question for the trier of fact.2
The first two elements, subject matter and competency of the parties, are the same elements necessary for any contract and are analyzed
in the same manner.2 3 As for proper subject matter, the parties are free
to agree to an accord and satisfaction for any claim involving a contract, personal property or the person." This includes tort damage
claims.2 6 A party is presumed to be competent and is only viewed as

11. 83 Ohio St. 169, 93 N.E. 892 (1910), overruled. AFC Interiors, 46 Ohio St. 3d at 5,
544 N.E.2d at 873 (1989).
12. Id. at 170, 93 N.E. at 893.
13. Id.
14. Id. In the law of commercial paper, negotiation involves the process of sale, discount,

assignment or transfer of negotiable paper (i.e. checks, notes).

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1036

(6th ed. 1990).
15. Seeds, 83 Ohio St. at 178, 93 N.E. at 894.
16. A claim is unliquidated if there is a bona fide dispute regarding the amount or validity
of the claim. Morris Skilken & Co. v. Watkins Furniture Co., 18 Ohio Op. 2d 374, 376, 176
N.E.2d 256, 376 (1961).
17. A claim is liquidated when it can be determined by arithmetical calculation. Cincinnati
v. Cincinnati St. Ry., 6 Ohio N.P. 140 (1899), affd, 8 Ohio N.P. 80 (1901).
18. Seeds, 83 Ohio St. at 174, 93 N.E. at 893.
19. Id. at 177-78, 93 N.E. at 894.
20. See, e.g., State, ex rel. Shady Acres Nursing Home, Inc. v. Rhodes, 7 Ohio St. 3d 7,
455 N.E.2d 489 (1983); Platt v. Penetryn Sys., 151 Ohio St. 451, 86 N.E.2d 600 (1949); Hearst
Corp. v. Lauerer, Markin & Gibbs, 37 Ohio App. 3d 87, 524 N.E.2d 193 (1987); Aerosonic
Instrument Corp. v. NuTone, Inc., 80 Ohio L. Abs. 289, 152 N.E.2d 739 (C.P. 1958).
21. Aerosonic, 80 Ohio L. Abs. at 290, 152 N.E.2d at 740.
22. See J.P. Burton Coal Co. v. John P. Gorman Coal Co., 22 Ohio App. 383 (1926).
23. See, e.g., Aerosonic, 80 Ohio L. Abs. at 290, 152 N.E.2d at 739.
24. 1 AM. JUR. 2D Accord and Satisfaction § 12 (1988).
25. Id.
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incompetent in extreme instances when the party is so impaired as to
be unable to participate meaningfully in the bargaining process.2 6
The requirement of mutual assent provides significant protection
for creditors." Mutual assent requires a meeting of the minds.2 8 The
creditor must have reasonable notice that there is a dispute and that
the creditor is aware that the check is offered as a settlement of the
dispute. 9 The agreement can be voided if there is a mutual mistake of
fact.3 0 If a party was induced into the agreement by fraudulent means,
that party has an action for damages."a Thus, a creditor can use these
common law mutual assent requirements to avoid an unfair situation.
Difficult questions arise in determining whether the mutual assent
requirement is satisfied when the creditor negotiates the check after
inserting language designed to reserve the remainder of his rights in the
dispute. 2 It is obvious that this is not the true "meeting of the minds"
contemplated by the mutual assent requirement. Yet, Ohio common
law, along with the common law of the majority of other states, holds
that the creditor's negotiation of the check results in an accord and
satisfaction despite the reservation of rights.3 3 The rationale for this
result is that "[t]he acceptance would be tortious unless the debtor's
terms are assented to, and the creditor is not allowed to assert that he
is a tortfeasor, when his acceptance can be given an effect involving no
legal wrong." 34
The importance of consideration was recognized in Seeds where
the Ohio Supreme Court required that a distinction be made between
liquidated and unliquidated claims. 5 The court held that:
[w]here there is a bona fide dispute over an unliquidated demand and
the debtor tenders an amount less than the amount in dispute, upon an

26. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 214 (1982). The most common kinds of impairment recognized today are immaturity and mental infirmity. Id.
27. Cass Constr. Co. v. Brennan, 222 Neb. 69, 78, 382 N.W.2d 313, 319 (1986) (rejecting
the argument that § 1-207 supersedes the doctrine of accord and satisfaction, in part, because
creditors were not at the mercy of the debtors under the common law).
28. See, e.g., Warner Elevator Mfg. Co. v. Higbee, 53 Ohio App. 546, 548, 5 N.E.2d 947,
948 (1935). "An accord and satisfaction is the result of an agreement between the parties, and
this agreement, like all others, must be consummated by a meeting of the minds of the parties."
Id.
29. Comment, U.C.C. Section 1-207 and the Full Payment Check: The Struggle Between
the Code and the Common Law-Where Do the Debtor and Creditor -Fit In?, 7 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 421, 423 (1982).
30. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 26, at 654.
31. Id.
32. Comment, supra note 29, at 424.
33. Comment, supra note 6, at 515-18.
34. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 420 comment a (1932).
35. 83 Ohio St. at 174-75, 93 N.E. at 893-94.
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express condition that, if accepted, it shall be in full of the disputed

claim, the creditor must accept it upon the condition unless the condition
be waived, otherwise he must refuse it ..

There, the consideration is found in the settlement of the dispute. 7
Yet, in most other jurisdictions, settlement of the dispute alone is not
sufficient consideration when the settlement is based on a liquidated
claim: the payor who pays no more than obligated to pay has given no
consideration for release of the creditor's remaining claims. 88 In order
for there to be consideration where a liquidated claim is involved, there
must be some additional item that provides new consideration, 9 without which an accord and satisfaction does not exist.
Prior to AFC Interiors, only a few Ohio courts had examined the
affect of Ohio Revised Code section 1301.130 on accord and satisfaction. 1 The first time this section was applied in Ohio was in Judge
Patton's dissent in Inger Interiors v. Peralta.2 The majority found that
the parties' dispute over the amount due for interior decorating services
was settled by an accord and satisfaction despite plaintiff's alteration of
the language on the back of the check to indicate a reservation of his
rights."' Judge Patton, however, felt that plaintiff's reservation of rights
was sufficient to avoid an accord and satisfaction." Judge Patton
briefly reviewed the Ohio cases dealing with this issue and admitted
that the case law supported the majority's decision.' 5 Judge Patton
then turned to section 1-207 and used it as the justification for his decision.' 6 He looked to the other jurisdictions that had considered the issue and relied heavily upon the South Dakota case, Scholl v. Tallman, 7 for support.' 8 Based on his approval of the South Dakota
Supreme Court's decision, Judge Patton urged Ohio to adopt South
Dakota's position because using section 1-207 in this manner would

36. Id. at 174, 93 N.E. at 893.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 175, 93 N.E. at 894.
39. Id.
40. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1301.13 (Baldwin 1988).
41. Hearst Corp v. Lauerer, Markin & Gibbs, 37 Ohio App. 3d 87, 524 N.E.2d 193 (1987);
Inger Interiors v. Peralta, 30 Ohio App. 3d 94, 506 N.E.2d 1199 (1986); Duhart v. Franklin Park
Lincoln-Mercury, No. 1-83-027 (Ohio Ct. App. July 1, 1983) (LEXIS, Ohio library, App file).
42. 30 Ohio App. 3d 94, 97, 506 N.E.2d 1199, 1202 (1986) (Patton, J., dissenting). Judge
Patton's dissent was cited with approval by the Ohio Supreme Court in AFC Interiors. 46 Ohio
St. 3d at 5, 544 N.E.2d at 872.
43. Inger, 30 Ohio App. 3d at 97, 506 N.E.2d at 1202 (Patton, J., dissenting).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 247 N.W.2d 490 (S.D. 1976).
48. Inger, 30 Ohio App. 3d at 97-98, 506 N.E.2d at 1202-03 (Patton, J., dissenting).
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serve to rescue the creditor from the mercy of the debtor."9
The next Ohio decision dealing with the application of section 1207 was Duhart v. Franklin Park Lincoln-Mercury," an unreported
decision in the Lucas County Court of Appeals. This case involved the
sale by defendant to a third party of a used car that defendant had
already contracted to sell to plaintiff.51 Defendant sent plaintiff a check
marked "payment in full" for the amount plaintiff had paid defendant
for the car.53 Plaintiff added language to the check reserving his rights
before he negotiated it." Plaintiff claimed. he still could maintain a
breach of contract action against defendant, but defendant asserted
that plaintiff was barred by. the doctrine of accord and satisfaction."
The court found that Only two of the elements necessary for a valid
accord and satisfaction were present: the subject matter was proper and
the parties were competent."
The two elements not present, according to the court, were mutual
assent and consideration." The court stated that plaintiff's reservation
of his rights demonstrated that the requisite meeting of the minds was
not present.5" No consideration for settlement of the dispute existed
because defendant only returned the money plaintiff had previously
paid him for the car." The partiesdid not dispute that defendant was
legally obligated to pay this amount to plaintiff.5 9 Thus, defendant offered no consideration for relinquishment of plaintiff's cause of action
for breach of contract. 0 After establishing the lack of a valid accord
and satisfaction, the court turned its attention to section 1-207.61
The court viewed section 1-207 as allowing plaintiff to maintain
another action for damages against defendant. 2 Significantly, the court
only considered section 1-207 after determining that a valid accord and
satisfaction did not exist. The Duhart court, therefore, did not address
the same question the Ohio Supreme Court faced-in AFC Interiors.
In Hearst Corp. v. Lauerer,Markin & Gibbs,63 the question of the

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
No. 1-83-027 (Ohio Ct. App. July 1, 1983) (LEXIS, Ohio library, App file).
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
37 Ohio App. 3d 87, 524 N.E.2d 193 (1987).
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applicability of section 1-207 to a valid accord and satisfaction was addressed by the same Lucas County court that had previously decided
Duhart. In Hearst, the correct amount due under an oral contract for
creating and publishing an advertisement in a magazine was disputed."4
Due to a disagreement concerning the location of the advertisement
within the magazine, the amount of money due under the contract was
in controversy.68 Defendant sent plaintiff a check marked "payment in
full," which plaintiff negotiated after reserving his rights. The Hearst
court found that a valid accord and satisfaction existed between the
parties because all four elements were present."' A contractual dispute
was a proper subject matter, 7 and both parties were competent.6 8 Because the dispute was bona fide, the court found that consideration did
exist for a valid accord and satisfaction." The central question was
whether there was sufficient mutual assent in light of plaintiff's reservation of rights. 0
In determining whether mutual assent was present, the court examined section 1-207 in the context of the doctrine of accord and satisfaction.7 1 The court first distinguished the Hearst case from Duhart by
noting the existence of the breach of contract action in Duhart.7 ' This
separate cause of action was the reason the Duhart court found that no
consideration had been given and that, therefore, a valid accord and
satisfaction did not exist. 3 In Hearst, there was no additional matter,
and the existence of consideration had already been acknowledged by
the court.7 ' The court rejected the applicability of Duhart to the situation in Hearst and looked instead to other Ohio cases, especially
75
Inger.
The court cited Judge Patton's dissent in Inger as persuasive but
disagreed with his conclusion,7 finding rather that the reasons for not
applying section 1-207 in the accord and satisfaction situation were

"much more numerous and persuasive" than the arguments in favor of

64.
65.
66.

Id. at 87, 524 N.E.2d at 194.
id. at 88, 524 N.E.2d at 194.
Id. at 89, 524 N.E.2d at 195.

67.

Id.
Id.
Id.

68.

69.

70. Id.
71. Id. at 89-94, 524 N.E.2d at 195-99.
72. Id. at 89, 524 N.E.2d at 195; see supra text accompanying notes 50-61 (discussing
Duhart).
73. Hearst, 37 Ohio App. 3d at 89, 524 N.E.2d at 195.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 90-91, 524 N.E.2d at 196-97; see supra text accompanying notes 42-46 (discussing Inger).
76. Hearst, 37 Ohio App. 3d at 91, 524 N.E.2d at 197.
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applying it.7 In reaching this decision, the court considered legislative
history, statutory language, policy aspects, and lack of mutual assent
which would allow the creditor to unilaterally determine the debtor's
rights.7 8 The decision of the court in Hearst aligned Ohio with the majority of states that do not allow section 1-207 to apply to accord and
satisfaction situations.?
B.

The Facts of AFC Interiors v. DiCello

AFC Interiors (AFC), plaintiff-appellant, entered into an oral contract with Nicholas DiCello, d.b.a. Ohio State Home Services
(DiCello), defendant-appellee, in June, 1984.80 The contract required
AFC to perform interior decorating services for DiCello's condominium. 8 1 AFC performed these services, purchasing certain furnishings
and delivering them to DiCello. 82 AFC then sent DiCello invoices for
the amount of the furnishings that AFC delivered to DiCello. 83 DiCello
did not pay these invoices and AFC filed an action for breach of contract against DiCello on November 7, 1984.84
On July 3, 1985, DiCello sent AFC a letter and a check. 85 In the
letter, DiCello said that, in accordance with the terms of their oral contract, he was returning those furnishings he did not want. 86 On the
back of the check DiCello had written "'[p]ayment in full for any and
all claims against Nick DiCello.' ",87 Upon receiving the furnishings,
letter and check, AFC crossed out the terms on the back of the check
and wrote "[p]ayment on [a]ccount." 88 The check was then
negotiated. 88
On October 22, 1987, DiCello filed a motion for summary judgment,9 0 arguing that the negotiation of the check by AFC in July of
1985 constituted an accord and satisfaction. 1 The trial court agreed
and granted the motion.92 The court of appeals affirmed the decision,"3

77.

Id.

78. Id. at 91-94, 524 N.E.2d at 197-99.
79. Id. at 94, 524 N.E.2d at 199.
80. AFC Interiors, 46 Ohio St. 3d at 2, 544 N.E.2d at 869.
81.

Id.

82.

Id.

83.

Id.

84.
85.

Id. at 2, 524 N.E.2d at 869-70.
Id. at 2, 524 N.E.2d at 870.

86.

Id.

87.

Id. (quoting Dicello's letter to AFC dated July 3, 1985).

88.

Id.

89.

Id.

90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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finding that all elements necessary for a valid accord and satisfaction
existed in this case. 94 AFC argued that there had not been a valid accord and satisfaction because there was no mutual assent based on its
reservation of rights.0 5 The court rejected that argument and instead
relied on Inger and Hearst to hold that section 1301.13 did not apply to
this factual situation." The court stated that section 1301.13 was to be
applied to the sale of goods rather than full payment checks. 97
The issue the Ohio Supreme Court faced was whether an accord
and satisfaction had taken place in light of section 1301.13.18 Several
courts and numerous commentators have addressed the affect of this
section on the common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction." There
93. AFC Interiors v. DiCello, No. 13501 (Ohio Ct. App. July 6, 1988) (LEXIS, Ohio library, App file).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. It might seem that the question of whether the U.C.C. applies at all to the factual
situation in this case (or any set of facts involving a "payment in full" check situation) should be

the preliminary question addressed by the courts. However, it already has been decided that article three of the U.C.C., entitled "Commercial Paper," applies to checks tendered as "payment in
full", and thus, the courts can consider whether section 1-207 applies. For a more in-depth discussion of this issue, see Fry, You Can't Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: Accord and Satisfaction
Survives the Uniform Commercial Code. 61 N.D.L. Rev. 353, 381 (1985); Rosenthal, supra note

3, at 68-71. But see RMP Indus. Ltd. v. Linen Center, 386 N.W.2d 523 (Iowa 1986) (refusing to
address applicability of § 1-207 because the dispute was based on a contract for services rather
than goods, despite the fact that a check was used).
99. For cases supporting the view that § 1-207 does not supersede the doctrine of accord
and satisfaction, see Anderson v. Rosebrook, 737 P.2d 417 (Colo. 1987); County Fire Door Corp.
v. C.F. Wooding Co., 202 Conn. 277, 520 A.2d 1018 (1987); Eder v. Yvette B. Gervey Interiors,
407 So. 2d 312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Stultz Elec. Works v. Marine Hydraulic Eng'g Co.,
484 A.2d 1008 (Me. 1984); Cass Constr. Co. v. Brennan, 222 Neb. 69, 382 N.W.2d 313 (1986);
Chancellor, Inc. v. Hamilton Appliance Co., 175 N.J. Super. 345, 418 A.2d 1326 (1980); Brown
v. Coastal Truckways, Inc., 44 N.C. App. 454, 261 S.E.2d 266 (1980); Pileco, Inc. v. HCI, Inc.,
735 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); State Dept. of Fisheries v. J-Z Sales Corp., 25 Wash. App.
671, 610 P.2d 390 (1980); Flambeau Prods. v. Honeywell Information Sys., 116 Wis. 2d 95, 341
N.W.2d 655 (1984); Jahn v. Burns, 593 P.2d 828, 830 (Wyo. 1979)
For authorities holding the view that § 1-207 does not supersede the common law doctrine of
accord and satisfaction, see A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1279 (pt.2 Supp. 1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 281 (1979); Fry, supra note 98, at 381-82; Hawkland,
The Effect of U.C.C. § 1-207 on the Doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction by Conditional Check,
74 CoMM. L.J. 329 (1969); McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the Uniform Commercial
Code: Some Implicationsfor Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 795, 824-28 (1978); Rosenthal,
supra note 3, at 49; Comment, Accord and Satisfaction: Conditional Tender by Check Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 18 BUFFALO L. REV. 539 (1969); Comment, supra note 29, at 423;
Note, Commercial Transactions-Michigan Rejects UCC and Adopts Minority Common Law
Standardfor Conditional Check Accord and Satisfaction, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1067 (1980).
For cases adopting the view that § 1-207 supersedes accord and satisfaction, see Miller v.
Jung, 361 So. 2d 788 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Majestic Bldg. Material Corp. v. Gateway
Plumbing, Inc., 694 S.W.2d 762 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Horn Waterproofing Corp. v. Bushwick
Iron & Steel Co., 66 N.Y.2d 321, 488 N.E.2d 56, 497 N.Y.S.2d 318 (1985); Kilander v. Blickle
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are two distinct views on this issue, which are set forth below.
C. The View that Section 1-207 Supersedes the Common Law Doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction
This view is based on the notion that accord and satisfaction forces
10 0 In fact, two
the good-faith creditor to make difficult, unfair choices.
commentators who are strong advocates of this position admit that they
10 1 They explain
are inclined to characterize- the debtor as a "chiseler."
their view of the dilemma caused by the common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction as:
Offering a check for less than the full amount claimed by the creditor but in "full settlement" is a common practice. If the amount offered
is not grossly insufficient, it presents the creditor with an exquisite dilemma: Will I accept the $9,000 and forfeit the other $1,000 that he
really owes me or do I refuse it all in the hope that I can get the $10,000

later?

02

The authorities and courts103 holding this view believe that section 1207 allows the creditor to accept a check offered in satisfaction of a
debt but also to retain his rights to the remainder of his claim.10 ' These
solution to the
authorities feel that section 1-207 provides a "fairer"
"cruel dilemma" faced by a good-faith creditor.10 5
These authorities point to the plain language of section 1-207 to
support their position. One court has stated that the most obvious reading of the provision supports the view that section 1-207 applies to the
full payment situation.'0 6 Other commentators argue that the provi07
sions of the U.C.C. are intended to be liberally construed,1 allowing
Co., 280 Or. 425, 571 P.2d 503 (1977); Scholl v. Tallman, 247 N.W.2d 490 (S.D. 1976).
For authorities advocating the view that § 1-207 supersedes the common law doctrine of
accord and satisfaction, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 9, at § 52-53; CALAMARI &
.
PERILLO, CONTRACTS §§ 5-16 (2d ed. 1977).
100. See, e.g., Horn Waterproofing Corp. v. Bushwick Iron & Steel Co., 66 N.Y.2d 321,
326, 488 N.E.2d 56, 59, 497 N.Y.S.2d 310, 313 (1985) (viewing the common law doctrine of
accord and satisfaction as creating a "cruel dilemma for the good-faith creditor"); Lange-Finn
Constr. Co. v. Albany Steel & Iron Supply Co., 94 Misc. 2d 15, 18, 403 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1015
(1978) (showing sympathy for the creditor's position by stating that application of § 1-207 to the
doctrine of accord and satisfaction eliminates the "gamble" the creditor was forced to make under
the common law).
101. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 9, at § 607-10.
102. Id. at § 607; see Note, Role of the Check in Accord and Satisfaction: Weapon of the
Overreaching Debtor, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 99 (1948) (discussing the situation faced by creditors).
103.

See supra note 99.

104. J.WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 607-10.
105. See, e.g., Horn Waterproofing Corp. v. Bushwick Iron & Steel Co., 66 N.Y.2d 321,
326-27, 448 N.E.2d 56, 59, 497 N.Y.S.2d 310, 313 (1985).
106. Id.
107. The applicable provision is U.C.C. § 1-102(2) which states that the "[u]nderlying pur-
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section 1-207 to permit a creditor to reserve his rights when accepting a
check tendered by a debtor as payment in full. 108 Even Professor Rosenthal, a strong critic of the view that section 1-207 supersedes the
common law, admits that section 1-207 can be read, without much
stretching, to reverse the rule of the "payment in full" check.' 0
Proponents of this view also rely on the 1961 Report of the State
of New York Commission on Uniform State Laws (the Report) to support their position.110 The drafters of the Report analyzed the U.C.C.
section-by-section and compared the provisions to the existing New
York law. 1 ' With respect to section 1-207, the Report stated:
This section permits a party involved in a Code-covered transaction to
accept whatever he can get by way of payment, performance, etc., without losing his rights to demand the remainder of the goods, to set-off a
failure of quality, or to sue for the balance of the payment, so long as he
explicitly reserves his rights.
.. . The Code rule would permit, in Code-covered transactions, the ac-

ceptance of a part performance or payment tendered in full settlement

without requiring the acceptor to gamble with his legal right to demand
the balance of the performance as payment." 2
This analysis of section 1-207 is noteworthy because the New York
legislature relied on the Report in adopting the U.C.C., and New
York's adoption of the Code influenced the national decision to adopt
the U.C.C." 8 The Report provides ample support for the view that sec14
tion 1-207 supersedes accord and satisfaction.1
Finally, proponents of the position that section 1-207 supersedes
the common law assert that this view furthers the purposes and policies
of the U.C.C. as set forth in section 1-102.115
poses and policies of this Act are (a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions; (b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties; (c) to make uniform the law among the various
jurisdictions." U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (1989).
108. Horn, 66 N.Y.2d at 331, 448 N.E.2d at 62, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
109. Rosenthal, supra note 3, at 56-58.
110. Id. at 61.
Il1. Id.

112. Id. at 61-62 (quoting the

LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF

REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS TO THE

N.Y. 19-20 (1961)).

113. "The New York Law Revision Commission's study and report on the Code had a
major impact on the final Official Texts." Id. Therefore, it has great value in interpreting the
meaning of various code sections. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 9, at 11.
114. N.Y. Annotations to the Uniform Commercial Code an Report of the Comm'n on
Uniform State laws, art. 1, 19-20 (1961), cited in Hawkland, supra note 99, at 332; see infra note
187 and accompanying text (discussing the comments to § 1-207 of other states adopting the
U.C.C. which can be read to support the view that § 1-207 is intended to supersede accord and
satisfaction); see also Comment, supra note 29, at 426-27; Note, supra note 99, at 1077.
115. For text of § 1-102(2), see supra note 107.
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By construing [section 1-207] to permit a reservation of rights whenever
a negotiable instrument is used to make payment on an existing debt,
regardless of the nature of the underlying obligation between the parties,
the commercial law of negotiable instruments is rendered more simple,
clear and uniform [reaching] all commercial transactions in which the
"
Code is implicated by reason of payment by an article 3 instrument. ,
Therefore, the authorities who support the view that section 1-207
supersedes the common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction base
their view on the language of the provision, the legislative history of the
state of New York, and the underlying purpose of the U.C.C. Their
view of the typical relationship between creditor and debtor is the motivation for their position.
D. The View That Section 1-207 Does Not Supersede the Common
Law Doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction
This view is based on the belief that accord and satisfaction is a
useful means of promoting informal settlements of bona fide disputes
between creditors and debtors. " 7 The authorities supporting this posi-tion do not view all debtors as imposing "torture" on innocent creditors.11 8 Rather, these authorities see the question from the debtor's
point of view. As one commentator explained:
It is unfair to the party who writes the check thinking that he will be
spending his money only if the whole dispute will be over, to allow the
other party, knowing of that reasonable expectation, to weasel around
the deal by putting his own markings on the other person's checks. There
is no reason why § 1-207 should be interpreted as being an exception to
the basic duty of good faith .....
The authorities supporting the view that the doctrine of accord and
satisfaction is not superseded by section 1-207 regard the debtor-creditor relation in a different light from the authorities arguing that section
1-207 changes the common law.
The authorities claiming that section 1-207 does not supersede accord and satisfaction use the language of section 1-207 as support for
their position. The section contemplates a party performing "in a man-

116. Horn Waterproofing Corp. v. Bushwick Iron & Steel Co., 66 N.Y.2d 321, 331, 488
N.E.2d 56, 62, 497 N.Y.S.2d 310, 316 (1985).
117. Rosenthal, supra note 3, at 56-58.
118. For authorities pointing out that a settlement offer in this context is no different than
any other settlement offer, see supra note 101. The decision of whether to accept or reject an offer
is a common decision one must make. The creditor thus need not be exempted from making that
choice. Rosenthal, supra note 3, at 56.
119. A. CORBIN, supra note 99, § 1279.
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ner demanded or offered by the other party."120 Yet, a creditor who

crosses out the "payment in full" language on the back of a check,
inserts language reserving his rights and then negotiates the check is
not performing "in a manner demanded or offered by the other
' Rather, the creditor is
party."121
explicitly acting in a way that rejects
performance in the manner contemplated by the debtor when the
debtor sent the check. 2 ' Under a traditional contract analysis, where
the check is viewed as an offer, the creditor, by changing the term, is
rejecting the "essential condition" of the debtor's offer.123 Therefore,
the actual language of section 1-207 provides support for the view that
it does not supersede the common law.
The Official Comment to section 1-207 also suggests that section
1-207 was not intended to supersede the doctrine of accord and satisfaction.12"' The Official Comment does not mention the doctrine of ac120. U.C.C. § 1-207 (1989). The commentators holding this position assert that § 1-207 is
intended to allow parties to continue performing under a contract without fear that such performance will result in a waiver. Hawkland, supra note 99, at 329.
121. Brown v. Coastal Truckways, Inc., 44 N.C. App. 454, 458, 261 S.E.2d 266, 269
(1980). In addition, § 1-207 appears to require that the other party receive notice of the reservation of rights before or at the time of the reservation. Yet, a party who receives a "full payment"
check and reserves his rights on the back of the check typically does not notify the offeror of the
check of the reservation of rights prior to reserving his rights. The offeror of the check does not
learn of the reservation of rights until he receives the canceled check. This fact pattern does not fit
the timing requirement set forth in § 1-207. Thus, this timing requirement further supports the
view that § 1-207 is not meant to apply to the "full payment" check situation. A. CORBIN, supra
note 99, § 1279.
122. McDonnell, supra note 99, at 827. Attention is also directed to the use of the word
"performance" rather than "payment" in § 1-207. Some commentators assert that the "performance" contemplated by this section must involve more than the payment of a single sum. For
support of this claim, these commentators rely on § 1-208 which distinguishes between "payment"
and "performance." E.g., A. CORBIN supra note 99, § 1279.
123. See, e.g., Cass Constr. Co. v. Brennan, 222 Neb. 69, 74, 382 N.W.2d 313, 318 (1986).
124. The Official Comment to section 1-207 states:
1. This section provides machinery for the continuation of performance along the lines
contemplated by the contract despite a pending dispute, by adopting the mercantile device
of going ahead with delivery, acceptance, or payment "without prejudice," "under protest,"
"under reserve," "with reservation of all our rights," and the like. All of these phrases
completely reserve all rights within the meaning of this section. The section therefore contemplates that limited as well as general reservations and acceptance by a party may be
made "subject to satisfaction of our purchaser," "subject to acceptance by our customers."
or the like.
2. This section does not add any new requirement of language of reservation where not
already required by law, but merely provides a specific measure on which a party can rely
as he makes or concurs in any interim adjustment in the course of performance. It does not
affect or impair the provisions of this Act such as those under which the buyer's remedies
for defect survive acceptance without being expressly claimed if notice of the defects is
given within a reasonable time. Nor does it disturb the policy of those cases which restrict
the effect of a waiver of a defect to reasonable limits under circumstances, even though no
such reservation is expressed.
U.C.C. § 1-207, comments 1, 2 (1989). According to White & Summers, the Official Comments
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cord and satisfaction nor does it mention any changes in the law that
the section was intended to make.1 5 This is significant because any
major changes made to existing law by a section are specified in the
Official Comments to that section.126 In addition, the Official Comment
states that the section was intended to provide "machinery for the continuation of performance along the lines contemplated by the contract
despite a pending dispute. 1 2 7 The second part of the Official Comment
is also relevant because it refers to an "interim adjustment in the
course of performance."' 12 8 This reference seems to exclude the idea of
an accord and satisfaction because an accord and satisfaction settles a
1 80 Thus, the Official
dispute. 29 It is not just an "interim" measure.
Comment lends insight to this debate.
The legislative history of the U.C.C. and section 1-207 provides
additional support for the view that section 1-207 does not supersede
the common law. The early drafts of Article 3 of the U.C.C. contained
a section that bears upon the meaning of section 1-207.131 This section,
in its final appearance in the U.C.C., read, "[w]here a check or similar
payment instrument provides that it is in full satisfaction of an obligation the payee discharges the underlying obligation by obtaining payment of the instrument unless he establishes that the original obligor
'
This prohas taken unconscionable advantage in the circumstances."1'
vision was specifically designed to deal with the "payment in full" situation and allowed for the doctrine of accord and satisfaction to apply
even in situations where there was no dispute.1 83 Under this section, the
only time that the full payment check would not be allowed to apply is
when it could be shown that the debtor took "unconscionable advantage" of the creditor."' Because the provision served to extend the
common law in a manner which it was feared would "work hardship"
8
and allow abuse, it was removed from the U.C.C. 3 ' This provision's

to the Code are the best guide for interpreting the text of the Code except for the text itself. J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 9, at § 13. The Official Comments cross-reference relevant
definitions and Code sections. The Comments can also serve to restrict the meaning of the text.
125. Hawkland, supra note 99, at 331.
126. Id.
127. U.C.C. § 1-207 (1989); see County Fire Door Corp. v. C.F. Wooding Co., 202 Conn.
277, 287-89 (1987). The idea that § 1-207 allows for the continuation of performance is further
supported by several sections of article two of the U.C.C. Id. at 287-89.
128. U.C.C. § 1-207.
129. See, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 99, at 827.
130. Id.
131. Rosenthal, supra note 3, at 59 (quoting U.C.C. § 3-802(3) (1952 Official Draft)).
132. Id. at n.45.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 60.
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importance, to the issue at hand is that it coexisted with section 1-207
for a number of years and several drafts without any cross-reference or
comment explaining that the two provisions were intended to address
the same subject matter.1 36
Additional support for the view that section 1-207 does not supersede accord and satisfaction is section 3-407, which addresses the unauthorized alteration of an instrument.1 1 7 When a creditor crosses out the
"payment in full" language on the check and reserves his rights, he
is
altering an instrument without authorization. Under section 3-407, unauthorized alteration can result in discharge from the terms of the contract or enforcement of the instrument "according to its original
tenor."'3 8 Yet these two potential results directly conflict with the view
that a creditor can reserve his rights and avoid an accord and satisfaction under section 1-207. Consequently, either sections 1-207 and 3-407

are in conflict or section 1-207 was not intended to apply to the "full

payment" situation. Section 3-407 therefore provides another indication

that section 1-207
satisfaction. 3 9

is not intended

to supersede

accord and

The view that section 1-207 does not change the common law doc-

trine of accord and satisfaction, therefore, finds support in the actual

language of the section, the Official Comment to the section and the

legislative history. Policy concerns and the purposes of the U.C.C. also

support this view. 40 This view is supported by both commentators and
a growing number of courts."4 ' Yet, it was not the view chosen by the
Ohio Supreme Court.

136. See, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 99, at 827; Rosenthal, supra note 3, at 58-60.
137. U.C.C. § 3-407 (1990). This section in pertinent part, states:
(1) Any alteration of an instrument is material which changes the contract of any
party thereto in any respect, including any such change in
(c) the writing as signed, by adding to it or by removing any part of it.
(2) As against any person other than a subsequent holder in due course,
(a) alteration by the holder which is both fraudulent and material discharges any
party whose contract is thereby changed unless that party assents or is precluded from
asserting the defense;
(b) no other alteration discharges any party and the instrument may be enforced according to its original tenor . ...
(3) A subsequent holder in due course may in all cases enforce the instrument according to its original tenor . . ..
Id.
138. Id.
139. See
1028, 1033-34
140. See
141. See

County Fire Door Corp. v'.C.F. Wooding Co., 202 Conn. 277, 284-86, 520 A.2d
(1987).
infra notes 98-216.
supra note 99.
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III. ANALYSIS
A.

The Decision in AFC Interiors v. DiCello

In AFC Interiors v. Dicello,'4" the Ohio Supreme Court addressed
the effect of Ohio Revised Code section 1301.13 on the common law
doctrine of accord and satisfaction and held that section 1301.13 superseded the doctrine of accord and satisfaction in the "full payment" situation.1" 8 The majority based its decision on several factors. The most
influential factor seemed to be a policy consideration.""
The majority believed that the Ohio legislature and the drafters of
the U.C.C. created section 1-207 "in response to a perceived injustice
14 5
to creditors" that occurs in an accord and satisfaction situation. Yet,
the majority offered no support for this opinion, nor was any legislative
history mentioned. Some support for this position should have been proof scholarly debate on this
vided by the majority in light of the amount
1 47
issue,14 6 which the court acknowledged.
The majority pointed to "a discernible trend" in support of their
ruling in this case. "1 8 Yet, as recent case law indicates, this is not
true.14 9 Currently, the only states whose high courts have agreed with
the AFC Interiors majority position are South Dakota"' and New
York.1 51 Both of these states had specific, unique reasons for adopting
this position. 15 2 As well, intermediate courts in Florida and North Carolina have adopted this view.15 8 However, other intermediate courts in
1
those states have adopted the opposite view. " In doing so, they have
5 5 In sum,
expressly limited the earlier decision or noted the conflict.

142. 46 Ohio St. 3d 1, 544 N.E.2d 869 (1989).
143. Id. The court did not first address whether the facts of the case constituted a valid
accord and satisfaction under common law. It seems the court should have determined that question as a preliminary matter before reaching the statutory issue. See, e.g., County Fire Door, 202
Conn. at 281, 520 A.2d at 1031 (statutory issue involving § 1-207 could not be addressed if it
could not be established that an accord and satisfaction had taken place).
144. AFC Interiors, 46 Ohio St. 3d at 4, 544 N.E.2d at 871.
145. Id.
146. See supra note 99.
147. AFC Interiors, 46 Ohio St. 3d at 3, 544 N.E.2d at 870.
148. Id. at 4, 544 N.E.2d at 871.
149. See infra notes 150-83 and accompanying text.
150. Scholl v. Tallman, 247 N.W.2d 490 (S.D. 1976).
151. Horn Waterproofing Corp. v. Bushwick Iron & Steel Co., 66 N.Y.2d 321, 488 N.E.2d
56, 497 N.Y.S.2d 318 (1985).
152. See infra notes 168-83 and accompanying text.
153. Miller v. Jung, 361 So. 2d 788 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Baillie Lumber Co. v.
Kincaid Carolina Corp., 4 N.C. 342, 167 S.E.2d 85 (1969).
154. Eder v. Yvette B. Gervey Interiors, Inc., 407 So. 2d 312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Brown v. Coastal Truckways, Inc., 44 N.C. App. 454, 261 S.E.2d 266 (1980).
155. See infra notes 156-67, 188-92 and accompanying text.
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the positions of Florida and North Carolina are not yet definite on this
issue. In light of the few jurisdictions holding the view that the Ohio
Supreme Court adopted and the number of jurisdictions adopting the
contrary view, it does not appear that Ohio has become part of the
"discernible trend."
In its attempt to show a "discernible trend," the majority discussed four cases. 156 In the first case, Baillie Lumber Co. v. Kincaid
Carolina Corp.,1 57 the North Carolina appellate court addressed the
application of section 1-207 of the U.C.C. in dicta. 1" Because the
claim in this case was liquidated, there was no consideration.159 The
Baillie court held that a valid accord and satisfaction had not occurred.160 After reaching this result, the court stated that the creditor's
reservation of rights on the back of the "payment in full" check tendered by the debtor complied with the requirements of section 1-207,
reserving the creditor's rights to collect the remainder of the debt. 1
Yet, the decision in Baillie was specifically limited by another North
Carolina appellate court in Brown v. Coastal Truckways, Inc." 2
The dispute in Brown involved the amount of compensation owed
by the employer to the employee. 6 ' The court found that a valid accord and satisfaction had occurred.'" The court also addressed the
question of whether section 1-207 applied to a "payment in full" check
situation.1 65 The court relied on the statute's language, Official Comment, and history in reaching the decision that section 1-207 does not
apply.166 Aware of the prior decision in Baillie, the Brown court stated
that "[t]here is some language in Baillie Lumber Co. v. Kincaid Carolina Corp. .

.

. which would support a different result. That case in-

volved a fully liquidated claim. It is not precedent for this case. 1 67 In
light of the Brown court's decision and the fact that the Baillie court's
statement was only dicta, the Baillie decision does not carry much
weight.
The majority in AFC Interiors also relied on the South Dakota
156.
157.
158.
159.
see supra
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

AFC Interiors, 46 Ohio St. 3d at 4, 544 N.E.2d at 871.
4 N.C. 342, 167 S.E.2d 85 (1969).
Id. at 353, 167 S.E.2d at 93.
Id. at 352, 167 S.E.2d at 92. For a discussion of liquidated and unliquidated claims,
notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
Bailie Lumber, 4 N.C. at 348, 167 S.E.2d at 89.
Id. at 353, 167 S.E.2d at 93.
44 N.C. App. 454, 261 S.E.2d 266 (1980).
Id. at 455, 261 S.E.2d at 267.
Id. at 458, 261 S.E.2d at 269.
Id. at 457, 261 S.E.2d at 268.
Id.
Id. at 458, 261 S.E.2d at 269.
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"
Supreme Court's decision in Scholl v. Tallman. In this case, which
involved a dispute over the amount due for construction work, the
South Dakota Supreme Court looked to the law of accord and satisfaction in that state. 16 9 South Dakota's doctrine of accord and satisfaction
differs from that of the majority of states. The position taken by the
South Dakota courts was first adopted in 1911 in Siegele v. Des
Moines Mutual Hail Insurance Association."" The Siegele court held
of a "paythat inserting language reserving one's rights on the back
17
Courts ap.
satisfaction
and
accord
an
avoided
ment in full" check
satisfacand
accord
an
find
to
refuse
plying South Dakota common law
viewed
court
Scholl
tion when there is a reservation of rights. The
section 1-207 as embodying the South Dakota position on accord and
detersatisfaction." 2 Applying section 1-207 to the case, the court
17
Because
place.
taken
not
had
satisfaction
mined that an accord and
Scholl was based on South Dakota's unique position on the doctrine of
accord and satisfaction, a position not shared by Ohio, this case is not
strong precedent for the majority's position in AFC Interiors.
Interiors
The final two cases discussed by the majority in AFC
6 involved a
74
Perkins,1
v.
Hanna
case,
were New York cases. The first
county court addressing the applicability of section 1-207 only in dicta.
The 76second, Horn Waterproofing Corp. v. Bushwick Iron & Steel
Co.' was decided by New York's highest court. The dispute in Horn
involved the proper amount due for repair work performed by the defendant.' 77 The court held that section 1-207 superseded the common
78 The court reviewed the argulaw doctrine of accord and satisfaction.
ments for both positions on the applicability of section 1-207 and found
79
some merit in each position.' The determinative factor for the court,
80
however, was the legislative history of section 1-207 in New York.'
The Report interpreted section 1-207 as applicable to the common law
8
doctrine of accord and satisfaction. ' The court recognized that the
Report "clearly apprised the [1]egislature that section 1-207 would

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

247 N.W.2d 490 (S.D. 1976).
Id. at 491.
28 S.D. 142, 132 N.W. 697 (1911).
Id.
Scholl, 247 N.W.2d at 492.
Id.
AFC Interiors. 46 Ohio St. 3d at 4, 544 N.E.2d at 871.
2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1044, 1046 (N.Y. County Ct. 1965).
66 N.Y.2d 321, 488 N.E.2d 56, 497 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1985).
Id. at 322, 488 N.E.2d at 56-57, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 310-11.
Id. at 323, 488 N.E.2d at 57, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 311.
Id. at 325-31, 488 N.E.2d 58-62, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 312-26.
Id. at 327-28, 488 N.E. 2d at 59-60, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 313-14.
Id. at 328, 488 N.E.2d at 60, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
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change the rule" regarding the applicability of accord and satisfaction
to the "payment in full" check situation.183 The Horn court thus held
that section 1-207 was applicable in this case and precluded the defendant's attempt at an accord and satisfaction. 183 These two New
York cases can be distinguished from AFC Interiorsv. DiCello because
of the difference in the legislative history of section 1-207 in New York
and Ohio.
The majority in AFC Interiors also cited the comments to section
1-207 of Delaware, Florida, Massachusetts and New Hampshire to
support the position that section 1-207 supersedes the common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction.'" However, of the courts in these
states, only Florida's has held that section 1-207 supersedes the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. This Florida case, Miller v. Jung,'s5
did not settle the question of the applicability of section 1-207 because
a later state appellate court reached the opposite result. 186 In Eder v.
Yvette B. Gervey Interiors,187 the Florida appellate court determined
that the Miller court's view did not comport "with logic and sound
public policy."' 88 The court also stated that it could not discern the
legislature's intent when it enacted section 1-207.119 The court announced that their opinion was in direct conflict with Miller. 90 Therefore, the majority's position in AFC Interiors is not strengthened by the
comments of these four states.
While the majority in AFC Interiors discussed case law on this
issue; it relied on policy considerations to overrule an eighty-year-old
precedent 9 ' and adopt a minority position with respect to section 1207.1'" With this decision, the majority attempted to "balance the interests of debtors and creditors in a more equitable manner."' 19
The dissent in AFC Interiors paid deference to the intent of the
Ohio legislature and the drafters of the U.C.C. by arguing that section
1-207 does not apply to the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. 9 ' The
dissent noted several of the points generally mentioned in support of
182. Id. at 329, 488 N.E.2d at 61, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
183. Id. at 323, 488 N.E.2d at 57, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 311.
184. AFC Interiors, 46 Ohio St. 3d at 4-5, 544 N.E.2d at 872; see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 9, at § 609.
185. 361 So. 2d 788 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
186. Eder v. Yvette B. Gervey Interiors, 407 So. 2d 312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 314.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See Seeds Grain & Hay Co. v. Conger, 83 Ohio St. 169, 93 N.E. 892 (1910).
192. See supra notes 100-15 and accompanying text.
193. AFC Interiors, 46 Ohio St. at 5, 544 N.E.2d at 872.
194. See supra notes 117-41 and accompanying text.
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this view, including the policy considerations favoring accord and satisfaction, the language of section 1301.13 and the Official Comment to
that section.1 95 The dissent also referenced several of the articles discussing this issue and set forth the multitude of cases supporting its
view.196 Thus, the dissent espoused the more reasoned and accurate side
of this issue.
B.

The Policy Impact of Ohio's Decision in AFC Interiors v. DiCello

The impact of the court's decision in AFC Interiors is two-fold.
1 97 and
First, it is at odds with the purposes and policy of the U.C.C.,
second, it will negatively affect public policy.
Ohio's adoption of the minority view of this issue will have an adverse impact on two sections of the U.C.C. The first is section 1102(2), which states that the "[u]nderlying purposes and policies of
this Act are (a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing
commercial transactions; (b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties;
19 8 Ohio's
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions."
application of section 1-207 to the "payment in full" situation will not
simplify, clarify or modernize the law. 199 Rather, Ohio's position complicates this situation. Fewer disputes will be settled informally for two
reasons. First, a debtor in a bona fide dispute will no longer be able to
tender a check because he will be unsure as to what action the creditor
will take. Second, even if the debtor does offer. the creditor a check in
compromise of the dispute, the creditor can still sue the debtor for the
excess amount reputed to be owing. Thus, the amount of litigation will
increase.
In addition, some sophisticated debtors might attempt to safeguard
against a reservation of rights by adding numerous terms along with
the "payment in full" condition. Still other parties will be forced to
negotiate detailed, formal settlement agreements. Thus, the situation is
not simplified, clarified or modernized as a result of Ohio's position.
Ohio's view also fails to further the purpose of "permitting continued expansion of commercial practices" because the elimination of accord and satisfaction as an informal means of dispute resolution will
195. AFC Interiors, 46 Ohio St. at 7-9, 544 N.E.2d at 874-75 (Brown, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 9, 544 N.E.2d at 875 (Brown, J., dissenting); see supra note 99.
197. The U.C.C. was drafted in order to provide for greater unity among the laws of the
various states as well as to promote certainty in commercial transactions. Note, supra note 99, at
1074.
198. U.C.C. § 1-102 (1989).
199. See Flambeau Prods. v. Honeywell Sys., 116 Wis. 2d 95, 110, 341 N.W.2d 655, 663
(1984) (application of section 1-207 to a "payment in full" situation does not simplify, clarify or

modernize the law).
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give pause to unsophisticated parties.20 ° The activity in this area of
commercial law will thereby be limited to the more sophisticated parties. In addition, the lack of an informal means of settling a dispute will
limit the expansion of commercial practices because elimination of this
method will create more litigation.20 '
Ohio's adoption of the view that section 1-207 does apply to "full
payment" checks also undercuts the purpose of uniformity. Ohio has
rejected the settled common law doctrine followed by a majority of
states for an interpretation that is followed by only a minority. 02 Instead of supporting stability and certainty in the law, Ohio has adopted
a position that runs contrary to these goals.2 ° '
A final underlying purpose of section 1-102 is to ensure that "the
law of commercial transactions [is], so far as reasonable, liberal and
nontechnical." '20 The application of section 1-207 to the "full payment" check situation contradicts this purpose: the destruction of the
doctrine of accord and satisfaction only serves to make this aspect of
debtor-creditor law more technical. The court's decision in AFC Interiors fails to further any of the purposes and policies set forth in section
1-102.

The policy of good faith set forth in section 1-203 is also impacted
by Ohio's position on this issue. This section, entitled "Obligation of
Good Faith," states that "[e]very contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." 205
The U.C.C. defines "good faith" in section 1-201(19) as "honesty in
fact. '' 0 It can be argued that a creditor violates this obligation when
he negotiates a check offered by the debtor only on the condition that
the matter be settled when the creditor has every intention of and does
reserve his rights. 207 Thus, the debtor's property is used in a manner
that he did not intend, and it would seem that the creditor has violated
the obligation of good faith.2 08 As stated by Corbin, the elimination of
the "full payment" language by the creditor and the inclusion of language reserving his rights is the "sort of alteration of financial instruments [that] ought not . . '. be encouraged by enforcing a unilateral

condition. added by the payee against a check drawer whose obvious,
200. For a discussion of the use of accord and satisfaction by unsophisticated debtors and
the necessity for this type of informal settlement tool, see Rosenthal, supra note 3, at 56-57.
201. Flambeau, 116 Wis. 2d at 110, 341 N.W.2d at 663.
202. For a list of courts which follow the majority rule, see supra note 99.
203. Flambeau, 116 Wis. 2d at 110, 341 N.W.2d at 663.
204. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 9, at § 15.
205. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1989).
206. Id. § 1-201.
207. Flambeau, 116 Wis. 2d at 111, 341 N.W.2d at 663.
208. Id.
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2 0 9 Therefore,
express intention was not to agree to the terms added."
Ohio's stance on the issue of the applicability of section 1-207 has a
negative impact on the fundamental policies of the U.C.C.
The AFC Interiors decision also has a, significant effect on public
policy. The Ohio Supreme Court claimed that the motivating factor for
10 Yet, this decision harms public policy.
its decision was public policy.

[Accord and satisfaction] has produced the settlement of many cases to
the great advantage of the commercial world and the public at large. It
therefore may be argued that [allowing] section 1-207 [to supersede the
doctrine of accord and satisfaction] is bad. . . in that it has the potential
of destroying a powerful weapon of compromise."'
The Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation of section 1-207 has rendered
12 The debtor is now faced with a
the "full payment" check ineffective.
no-win situation, and it is unlikely that debtors will rely on the doctrine
of accord and satisfaction in the future.
Traditionally, the use of a check marked "payment in full" has
been a simple, inexpensive means of settlement that greatly reduced the
amount of litigation reaching the courts. The court in AFC Interiors
feared misuse of this settlement tool by the debtor. Yet, even those
opposing the "full payment" check doctrine acknowledge that there is
no real concern that this settlement device will be misused in commercial transactions. 1 The common law requirements of an accord and
satisfaction provide the creditor with significant protection from an
overreaching debtor. 14 In balancing the minimal risk of abuse against
16
the large public benefit from the private resolution of disputes, it is
clear that section 1-207 should not be used to supersede the doctrine of
accord and satisfaction. 16
IV.
A.

RECOMMENDATIONS IN LIGHT OF OHIO'S DECISION

Individual Responses
While the decision in AFC Interiors limits the ability of a debtor

209. A. CORBIN, supra note 99, § 1279.
210. AFC Interiors, 146 Ohio St. 3d at 5, 544 N.E.2d at 872.
211. Hawkland, supra note 99, at 332.
212. See Comment, supra note 29, at 433.
213. Hawkland, supra note 99, at 332.
214. See supra notes 20-39 and accompanying text; see also Cass Constr. Co. v. Brennan,
222 Neb. 69, 78, 382 N.W.2d 313, 319 (1986) (recognizing that the common law provides sufficient protection for creditors); Comment, supra note 6, at 525-27; Comment, supra note 29, at
432-33.
215. Many consumers embroiled in disputes with large, corporate creditors have been able
to use the "full payment" check to settle their disputes. See Rosenthal, supra note 3, at 56.
216. Hawkland, supra note 99, at 332.
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to attempt to settle bona fide disputes, the debtor does still have several
options available. The first option is for the debtor to simply accept
that use of a "full payment" check has been foreclosed and thus attempt to resolve the dispute through formal settlement negotiations and
agreements. This approach, however, creates several problems. First, it
is neither simple nor efficient. Second, only the sophisticated debtor
would be able to use this option. Finally, it can prove very costly.
The second option is for the debtor to send a check to the creditor
marked "payment in full" and containing additional language "contracting out" of section 1-207. The notation on the back of the check
could read:
"Payment in full. Upon cashing the check the creditor agrees to
fully discharge the debtor from liability for the debt arising out of (specify obligation) and further agrees not to reserve any rights with respect
to that obligation and to waive his right to use section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The return or destruction of this check shall
mean that the creditor has rejected these conditions, but the act of cashing it shall be deemed to be conclusive evidence that he has accepted
them."" 7
It is unlikely, however, that such a clause would be successfully upheld
because one can only vary the U.C.C. by agreement and one can only
have an agreement when there has been an acceptance. 18 It appears
that this clause is only a "fancier form" of the traditional accord and
satisfaction.
As a precautionary measure, the debtor can also attempt to "contract out" of section 1-207 when entering into the initial contract. Section 1-102(3) allows variation of the U.C.C. provisions by agreement.2 19 The parties to the contract could agree that section 1-207 is

217. Id. at 342. Alternative language that could be used is:
I, John Debtor, present this check to William Creditor in full settlement of my existing debt to said creditor arising out of (specify obligation). The creditor agrees to accept
this check in full payment, to forbear from future suit on the debt, and to refrain from
seeking to reserve his rights by accepting the check "under protest", or "without prejudice"
or by similar reservation. Consideration for the above promises is my tender of this check
to compromise a debt disputed in good faith. The check is not offered pursuant to, or along
the lines of, the original contract, but in recision and substitution of that contractual obligation and for an accord and satisfaction. The return or destruction of this check will
evidence the creditor's rejection of this tender, while the act of cashing the check shall be
acceptance of this contract and its attendant conditions.
Comment, supra note 99, at 544 (footnotes omitted).
218. Rather than solving the dispute, it is likely that the use of this type of clause would
result in a "battle of the forms." See Cass Constr., 222 Neb. at 79, 382 N.W.2d at 320; Rosenthai, supra note 3, at 71-74.
219. U.C.C. § 1-102(3). This section provides that:
The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except as otherwise
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20
By taking this precaunot applicable to the bargain between them.
tionary measure whenever entering into an agreement, the parties ensure the availability of using an accord and satisfaction as an efficient,
informal means of compromise should a dispute arise. There is, however, no guarantee that this type of measure would be successful. Also,
it provides no aid for the unsophisticated debtor who was not aware of
the need to "contract out" of section 1-207. This is not, therefore, a
satisfactory solution.
Another option is for the debtor, if possible, to have the original
agreement, and therefore the underlying dispute, governed by the law
of a jurisdiction other than Ohio. By providing for the transaction to be
construed according to the law of a state that still recognizes the doctrine of accord and satisfaction, the debtor can preserve his right to use
2
Again, there are sevthis informal means of settlement if necessary.
action contrary to
prompts
it
First,
option.
this
to
eral disadvantages
have several more
may
debtor
the
the purposes of the U.C.C. Second,
important reasons for selecting Ohio as the jurisdiction whose law
should govern. In addition, this option also requires action to be taken
prior to the dispute arising. It is useless once the contract has been
entered into by the parties. Finally, the debtor might not be able to
avoid having Ohio law govern the transaction.
The debtor might also attempt to have the transaction character22
ized as a contract for services rather than goods. 1 If the agreement is
construed as one involving services or a combination of goods and services, the debtor may be able to successfully argue that section 1-207 is
not applicable because the U.C.C. does not apply to contracts for services. If the debtor is successful in making this argument, he will be
able to use the doctrine of accord and satisfaction to settle the dispute.
However, this option provides the debtor with no guarantees. In order
to make the argument that section 1-207 is not applicable, the debtor
will have to tender a full payment check to the creditor and then be
willing to go to court to prove his point. This is a gamble that few

provided in this Act and except that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness
and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement but the parties may
by agreement determine the standards by which the performance of such obligations is to
be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.

Id.
220.
221.

Hawkland, supra note 99, at 342.
This option is limited by section 1-105, the choice of law provision. U.C.C. § 1-105

(1989).
222. For a discussion of the applicability of the U.C.C. to "full payment" checks, see
sources cited supra note 99. See also Goggin & Grosse, Accord and Satisfaction and the 1-207
Dilemma. 89 COM. L.J. 537, 540 (1984) (discussion of the extent to which the U.C.C. covers
certain transactions).
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debtors will be willing to take, especially because the debtor would still
face the costs and inconvenience of going to court. None of these solutions is as effective as the "full payment" check method was prior to
the decision in AFC Interiors.
B.

Societal Response

There are two courses of action that can be adopted in response to
Ohio's decision. The first involves legislative action. Because the majority based its decision on what it believed to be the intent of the Ohio
legislature, a clarification of the purpose for which section 1-207 was
adopted and legislative approval of the doctrine of accord and satisfaction would effectively eliminate the grounds upon which the majority
based its decision.2 2 Thus, accord and satisfaction would again become
a convenient means of settlement in Ohio.
The second course of action has two parts. First, the court could
overrule the decision in AFC Interiors. Second, the court could employ
the common law contractual protections to police the bargain in an accord and satisfaction situation. 2 4 By strengthening these safeguards,
the concerns of the majority would be answered and the doctrine of
accord and satisfaction would be improved.
V.

CONCLUSION

In AFC Interiors, the Ohio Supreme Court held that Ohio Revised
Code section 1301.13 superseded the common law doctrine of accord
and satisfaction. In adopting this position, Ohio joins a minority of
223. After the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in AFC Interiors, U.C.C. section 1-207 was
amended to state:
(1) A party who, with explicit reservation of rights, performs or promises performance or
assents to performance in a manner demanded or offered by the other party does not
thereby prejudice the rights reserved. Such words as "without prejudice", "under protest" or the like are sufficient.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to accord and satisfaction.
U.C.C. § 1-207 (1990). The comment to the newly amended section explains the reason for the
amendement:
Judicial authority was divided on the issue of whether former Section 1-207 (present
subsection (1)) applied to an accord and satisfaction. Typically the cases involved attempts
to reach an accord and satisfaction by use of a check tendered in full satisfaction of a
claim. Subsection (2) of revised Section 1-207 resolves this conflict by stating that Section
1-207 does not apply to an accord and satisfaction. Section 3-311 of revised Article 3
governs if an accord and satisfaction is attempted by tender of a negotiable instrument as
stated in that section. If Section 3-311 does not apply, the issue of whether an accord and
satisfaction has been effected is determined by the law of contract. Whether or not Section
3-31 i applies, Section 1-207 has no application to an accord and satisfaction.
U.C.C. § 1-207, official comment 3 (1990). If the Ohio Legislature adopts the newly amended
section 1-207, AFC Interiors will effectively be overruled and the accord and satisfaction dilemma
resolved.
224. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
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states supporting this view. This position, however, runs contrary to the
intended purpose of the section. This position also has negative public
policy consequences. Therefore, Ohio's position should be changed either through legislative or judicial action.
Susan M. Barrett
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